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1 Introduction 
In a survey of inequality literature Helpman concludes that “although we can argue 
with limited confidence that inequality within a country slows growth, we can not say much 
about the channels through which this influence plays out“ (Helpman 2004: pp. 93-94). 
Lacking knowledge of the determinants of personal income inequality, the 
relationship between income inequality and growth is hard to underpin theoretically. 
The linear equation that is widely applied in regression studies is based on partial 
theory and responds weakly to empirical testing.1 Research is further constrained by 
the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework and scarcity of reliable data. 
Literature therefore has stressed the need to accumulate more compatible data 
(Deininger and Squire 1996, Atkinson 2002), to decompose personal income 
distribution into its functional income distribution components and to pay more 
attention to the historical distribution of assets (Atkinson 1997, Birdsall and Londono 
1997).  
  This paper aims to contribute to this research agenda by exploring the 
historical roots of land and income distribution. An analysis of the historical 
determinants of land distribution deepens our understanding of the path dependent 
characteristics of inequality which in turn contributes to the analysis of the 
inequality-growth relationship. For this purpose I constructed a dataset including 
new and existing land distribution estimates for the 20th century. These estimates are 
analysed in an ordinary cross-country OLS framework. The two central questions 
addressed are 1) what explains the cross-country variation in land inequality at the 
end of the colonial period? 2) how does initial land inequality relate to current 
(1990’s) income inequality? 
 
There are various reasons to pay specific attention to land distribution. A practical 
advantage is that land distribution data can be derived from uniform standardised 
surveys which make them more compatible, both for spatial and temporal 
comparisons, than elaborate income distribution estimates (Deininger and Squire 
1996, Li, Squire and Zou 1998). But there are important theoretical considerations as 
well.  
The observed rigidity in post-war income inequality levels in a majority of 
countries indicates that path dependent factors are important. Initial levels of land 
inequality are a good candidate to reflect the initial conditions of inequality (Birdsall 
and Londono 1997, Deininger and Squire 1998). In pre-industrial societies land is the 
primary factor of production and naturally exerts large influence on income and 
profits. Moreover, land is an important object of wealth investments and the 
distribution of wealth is particularly persistent over time. Land can be inherited from 
generation to the next generation but geographically it is immobile. Factors such as 
labour, knowledge, machinery or ICT can be moved around, yet land can not. Land 
also depreciates at a slower pace than most other forms of physical and natural 
                                                      
1 It is likely that levels of income inequality above and below a certain threshold are both negatively associated to 
growth. High levels of income inequality in Latin America result via various channels into suboptimal economic and 
social development (Worldbank 2004, Galor and Zeira 1993), whereas very low levels of income inequality, for 
example in former socialist  states, are the result of distorting market interventions impeding on growth.       3
capital. All these characteristics contribute to an endured impact of land distribution 
on the distribution of income, assets and wealth (Worldbank 2004).  
Taking the argument one step further back, the question becomes whether 
persistency in inequality can even be related to the determinants of land inequality?  
Does the historical distribution of land play a central role in the causality chain that 
shapes the current cross-country variation in levels of income inequality? What 
would this central role of land distribution look like? The ample historical literature 
focusing on land inequality in Latin America serves as a good point of departure to 
assess these questions.  
During a period of more than three centuries (1492-1829) Iberian settlers 
reorganised the pre-Columbian system of agricultural production in order to 
generate surpluses and redirect labour to mining activities in Mexico and the Andes. 
Confronted with chronic shortages of labour the encomienda (right to taxation and 
labour tributes) was introduced to supply the large agricultural estates (latifundias) 
and the silver mines with indigenous labour. In the coastal zones of Brazil and on the 
Caribbean islands tropical cash crops such as sugar and coffee were produced on 
large scale capital intensive plantations. These plantations were mainly driven by 
African slave labour. The coexistence of Iberian latifundias  and indigenous 
subsistence holdings polarised the distribution of land holdings. The presence of the 
Catholic church further enhanced this bi-polarity since the clergy bought and 
inherited land in order to materialize its position as a supreme religious authority 
(Engerman and Sokoloff 2005, Fernandez-Armesto 2003, Lal 1998).  
  Natural conditions and relative factor endowments shaped the Iberian 
strategy of colonial exploitation. The redistribution of land from indigenous peasants 
to the Creole elite was one of the key elements in this strategy. This colonial heritage 
subsequently impacted deeply on economic development and income distribution 
during independence (Engerman and Sokoloff 2005). Exploring the structural factors 
behind initial land inequality and today’s income inequality are the focal point of this 
paper. For the time being, temporary fluctuations in income inequality as a result of 
for instance the business cycle or inflationary shocks are considered as part of the 
ceteris paribus condition.      
 
In section 2 the data and land distribution estimates are discussed and compared to 
existing datasets. The cross-country variation in land inequality is presented and 
rudimentary explored. Section 3 provides a brief overview of regression literature in 
which the land distribution variable is included. In section 4 the hypotheses 
regarding the causes of land inequality and the relation between land and income 
distribution are discussed. In section 5 OLS regressions of land inequality are 
estimated. Section 6 deals with the relationship between initial land inequality and 
current income inequality. OLS regressions of income inequality are estimated. 
Section 7 provides a short afterthought on the relation between land inequality and 




   4
2 Land distribution: data, sample selection and first impressions      
 
2.1 Data 
Cross-country analyses including estimates of land distribution usually refer to two 
different data sources. The first is a dataset compiled by Taylor and Hudson (1972: 
pp. 267-269) consisting of 54 gini-coefficients of land distribution in different 
countries in some year close to 1960. The second dataset was introduced more 
recently by Deininger and Squire (1998) and consists of 261 gini-coefficients of 103 
different countries, of which, so far, 60 different country observations around the 
year 1960 have been published (Deininger and Olinto 1999: pp. 24). Both datasets 
mainly rely on the data provided by the FAO World Census of Agriculture.2  
The dataset I constructed for this paper is based on cens u s data from the 
International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) and the FAO as well. The estimates of land 
inequality are presented in table A.1 in the  appendix. In this table the figures of 
Taylor and Hudson and Deininger and Olinto (T&H and D&O hereafter) estimates 
are also included in order to compare. From ca. 250 observations 186 gini-coefficients 
and theil-coefficients3 relating to 105 different countries were selected for the dataset 
(which I will refer to as the Frankema estimates hereafter).   
  A correlation analysis of the three datasets is presented in table 1. The matrix 
shows that the D&O and Frankema estimates correlate substantially better than any 
of these two correlates with the “older” T&H estimates. Although the D&O and 
Frankema estimates correlate better a correlation-coefficient of 0.90 still leaves room 
for substantial differences. How can these differences be explained? 
 
 
Table 1: Correlation of three datasets of land gini’s around 1960   
 
  Deininger & Olinto  Taylor & Hudson 
Frankema 0,90  0,78 
Taylor & Hudson  0,79  1,00 
  
Sources: Taylor and Hudson (1972: pp. 267-269) Deininger and Olinto (2001: pp. 24) 
 
P a r t  o f  i t  m i g h t  b e  e x p l a i n e d  b y  t h e  method employed to calculate the gini-
coefficient. The Frankema estimates are based on decile shares as presented in an 
example calculus in table A.2 (appendix). For the D&O estimates the exact formula 
and breakdown in shares is not reported. Also the exact year of reference is not 
reported in the D&O paper, which might also explain part of the gap. Another 
possibility is that the underlying source data have passed through several revisions 
or adjustments within the FAO. The estimates D&O present are based on inside 
sources provided by the FAO to the authors.     
In order to calculate a gini-coefficient or a theil-coefficient of land distribution 
on a national level one needs to combine information regarding the total amount of 
                                                      
2 This census has been initiated in 1924 by the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) in Rome. This institute 
preceded the FAO, which was founded after the Second World War. The World Census of Agriculture has been 
executed each decennium since the 1930’s, with the exception of the 1940’s (due to the war).  
3 Gini and Theil. R2 is 0.98X    5
agricultural land (excluding communal pastures and forests), the total number of 
land holdings (farms) and the total amount of land per farm. Although the 
agricultural surveys of the FAO are rather straightforward, which enhances the 
spatial and temporal comparability of land inequality estimates, these requirements 
are not always met.   
First of all it should be pointed out that the estimates refer to the distribution 
of land holdings, meaning the disposable amount of land per farm, which is not the 
same as the land owned by the farmer. Land property is generally more unequally 
distributed than land holdings, depending on the share of land under tenure. The 
distribution of land holdings may serve as a lower benchmark of the land property 
distribution, although there is no need to interpret land inequality estimates this 
way. The distribution of land holdings itself is a clear analytical concept since it 
captures the “access” to land as a production factor, rather than the more passive 
distribution of ownership of land as a wealth investment. A limitation of both 
concepts is that differences in land quality are not taken into account and there is 
little that can be done to correct this.   
Several surveys provide an incomplete coverage of agricultural land or an 
incomplete coverage of land holdings. For this reason more than 60 observations had 
to be excluded from the dataset.4 Around one-third of these were excluded because 
surveys did not make a distinction between communal land holdings and single 
private land holdings. Indeed, the estimated land gini’s of socialist Eastern European 
countries in the 1970’s and 1980’s (see also Deininger and Squire 1998: pp. 266) 
display extreme land inequality since private small-holders and communal holdings 
are both counted as individual farm holdings. In fact, these gini’s do not properly 
reflect the inequality of “access” to land and therefore had to be excluded.5 This 
problem also occurred in the case of the ejidos6 in Mexico.7  
An important distinctive feature of the dataset presented here concerns a 
considerable amount of pre-war estimates derived from the reports of the 
International Institute of Agriculture (IIA). These “early” observations are necessary 
to improve the sample used in regressions of land inequality, as I will explain in the 




                                                      
4 a) Some surveys only include cropland and exclude pastureland. Usually this sample bias applies to countries with 
a minimal share of pastureland or, countries in which pastures are part of communal estates and therefore not subject 
to a personal distribution measure. FAO statistics also provide statistics on crop and livestock production, which 
enables an evaluation of the validity of the surveys that are exclusively based on cropland. In Chad and Botswana the 
exclusion of pastures in the sample lead to a misrepresentation of livestock production and these countries are 
therefore excluded from the data set. Also Madagascar and Malawi are excluded because of incomplete coverage. b) 
In some cases farms are differentiated into traditional indigenous household holdings and European holdings, 
reflecting the traditional colonial categorisation of land holdings. Surveys taking only one category into account will 
underestimate actual land inequality For this reason Zimbabwe and Tanzania a.o. are excluded. For Zambia (1960) 
and Congo (1990) one observation is rejected, yet an alternative observation is accepted.  
5 In the Deininger and Olinto paper former communist Eastern European countries are excluded, but in the study by 
Deininger and Squire (1998) the East European land gini’s are used in an inequality-growth analysis which 
undoubtedly impacts on the results. 
6 Communal land holdings operated by a group of indegenous farmers.  
7 However, since Deininger and Olinto (2001) obtain estimates of Bolivia, Madagascar, Mexico and Tanzania and 
Taylor and Hudson (1972) obtain estimates for Luxembourg and Libya I either missed or are more plausible than the 
estimates I excluded, these estimates are used to complement the regression sample.    6
2.2 Two samples 
The first sample I constructed is referred to as the 1960 sample and includes 93 
countries with an observation in the period 1950-1975. This sample can be used to 
compare land inequality between countries in a relatively constrained period of time. 
The second sample is referred to as the extended sample and consists of 111 country 
observations, distributed over the entire twentieth century. This sample includes for 
each country seperately the land inequality estimate closest to its year of 
independence and for non-colonial countries the earliest year available. For the 
majority of Asian and African countries this means an estimate of land inequality 
around 1960. For most New World countries the ideal benchmark year however 
refers to the late eighteenth, nineteenth century or early twentieth century. For the 
majority of these countries the required data is simply unavailable. 
How to tackle this problem? The early pre-war observations for New World 
countries probably reflect the impact of colonial land distribution better than a 1960 
benchmark. These observations precede most of the substantial structural changes in 
land distribution during the twentieth century and in most countries temporal 
changes in land inequality are small anyway8 (Li, Squire and Zou 1998). Historical 
evidence for Latin American countries suggests that major changes in the 
distribution of land during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries hardly occurred 
(Engerman and Sokoloff 2001, Worldbank 2004). This rigidity is indeed perfectly 
illustrated by the time-series data for Argentina, Brazil and Chile in table A.1. 
Therefore I do not expect that the Latin American estimates pose a real problem.    
More insecure are the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Fortunately, for all of these countries there is an early twentieth century observation 
available (resp. 1910, 1931, 1910 and 1910). The question is to what extent these 
estimates reflect the level of land inequality as it took shape during the colonial era? 
Australia and New Zealand became formally independent shortly after the turn of 
the century (resp. 1901 and 1907), which minimizes our problem. For the USA (1776) 
and Canada (1867) I consulted the inequality-index constructed by Adelman and Taft 
Morris (1988) for the year 1850. Land gini’s of 57,1 (USA) and 48,7 (Canada) fit rather 
well into their conclusions on the wealth distribution of both countries. Perhaps the 
estimates are a little too high, almost certainly not too low. However, until better 
estimates become available these figures will be taken for granted.       
The extended sample is thus composed of all available post-war observations 
for Asian and African countries, whereas for the New World countries the earliest 
available observation is included. For countries without a colonial past  (i.e. 
European, China and Japan) also the earliest observation available is included. This 
sample gives in my view the best possible reflection of cross-country variation in 
land inequality during periods of colonisation. I expect the effects of technological 
and organisational modernisation on the value of the land gini and land theil to be of 
subordinate importance. Nevertheless thee regression results should always be 
interpreted with this  “ceteris paribus assumption” in mind.  
 
 
                                                      
8 Li, Squire and Zou concluded from an anlysis of variance (ANOVA) that more than 90% of the variation in land 
inequality is due to cross-country variation and less than 10% due to temporal variation.   7
2.3 First impressions 
What does a first glance at the data reveal? Table 2 presents uncompounded averages 
of land gini’s from the 1960 sample (first column) and the extended sample (fourth 
column) for 13 regions in the world. Furthermore, the variation within the region is 
expressed by the coefficient of variation in the second and fifth column, whereas the 
third and sixth column denote the amount of observations. This regional comparison 
brings up some interesting questions concerning the causes and consequences of 
land distribution, which will be briefly addressed.    
 
Table 2: Uncompounded regional averages of land gini’s and intra-regional 
variation (CV = Coefficient of Variation) 
 
  1960 sample (1950-1975)  extended sample (20
th century) 
   Gini   CV   No. Obs.  Gini   CV   No. Obs. 
East Asia  36,5  0,14 3 38,4  0,14 4 
South Asia  53,7  0,16 6 53,7  0,16 6 
South East Asia  49,8  0,26 6 47,9  0,24 8 
           
North Africa and Middle East  66,9  0,11 9 65,1  0,11 12 
South and East Sub Saharan Africa   64,3  0,26 10 62,7  0,28 12 
West and Central Sub Saharan Africa  47,1  0,19 11 45,2  0,20 14 
           
South America  82,1  0,04 10 79,9  0,08 11 
Central America  72,3  0,08 7 72,3  0,08 7 
Caribbean  68,3  0,17 7 68,1  0,17 7 
           
Western Offshoots  68,0  0,18 4 64,5  0,22 4 
           
Western Europe  60,0  0,17 14 63,9  0,16 14 
Eastern Europe  .  . 2  49,3  0,15 8 
Scandinavia  40,8  0,17 4 51,0  0,19 4 
                    
World 60,9  0,25  93  59,8  0,25  111 
 
East Asia: China, Japan, Korea. Rep, Taiwan; South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka;  
South East Asia: Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. 
North Africa & Middle East: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey;  East & South Sub Saharan Africa: Botswana, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Reunion, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia; West & Central Sub Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, 
Uganda; Western Offshoots: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA; Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK; Eastern 
Europe: Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Yugoslavia,   
 
 
The table reveals that the four East Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and 
China) are among the world’s most egalitarian. Ranking all countries from low to 
high land inequality in the extended sample, South Korea ranks 2, Taiwan 9, Japan 12 
and China 20. With the exception of China, the East Asian countries are known for 
having realised “growth with equity”. In literature it is argued that land reforms 
dismantled the power of landowning elites paving the way for more equitable 
distributions of assets and income. The dramatic decline (from 53.9 in 1920 to 39.0 in 
1960) in the Taiwanese land gini illustrates the impact of the land reforms carried out   8
during Japanese colonial rule (Fei, Ranis and Kuo 1979, Worldbank 1993, Frankema 
and Smits 2005).  
  South Asian and South East Asian land holdings are more skewed and the 
intra-regional variance is quite large in South East Asia. Land inequality in Malaysia 
is exceptionally high for Asian standards with a gini of 68.0, which may be pointing 
at the impact of its large (colonial) rubber economy. Another typical rubber economy, 
Sri Lanka, is also at the high end with a gini of 62.3. On the lower end we find the 
labour abundant rice economies such as Bangladesh (41.7) and Laos (38.2). These 
figures suggest that relative factor endowments (ratio of labour to land) and crop 
specialisation (rubber, rice) indeed influence the distribution of land.   
The intra-regional differences in Sub Saharan Africa are also large. A rough 
distinction can be observed between South and East Africa versus West and Central 
Africa: Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa are particularly unequal, whereas 
on the other hand Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal display land 
gini’s that are far lower than the world’s average of 59.8. This categorization does not 
hold in detail however, since land inequality in Mozambique is much lower than in 
Liberia for instance. But the general picture of and East-West demarcation is rather 
obvious and becomes even more visible when West and Central Africa is compared 
to the high levels of land inequality in North Africa and the Middle East.    
The extraordinary high levels of land inequality in Latin American countries  
appears to be part of a coherent regional pattern. In spite of the differences between 
the South American, Central American and Caribbean averages, together these three 
regions display the world’s largest inequality in land holdings. In the previously 
mentioned country ranking the bottom 20 includes 16 Latin American countries! The 
assertion in the literature that there is a “Latin” effect in Latin American inequality 
(Worldbank 2004) is fully supported by these figures, with the sole exception being 
Haiti.  
  The four Western Offshoots (USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia) are 
typical land abundant immigrant countries. It should be noted that the levels of land 
inequality in the Pacific countries and the North American countries differ largely, 
flawing the average. These countries have also witnessed quite substantial changes in 
the distribution of land during the twentieth century. The USA started out at 
considerably lower levels of land inequality which gradually went up due to large 
transformations in the scale of production. In relatively equal Canada and relatively 
unequal Australia, land holdings also became more unevenly distributed. In New 
Zealand on the other hand, initially high land gini’s decreased gradually.  
Finally, European intra-regional variation is large, although a rough East-
West as well as rough North-South distinction can be made. East European countries 
and Scandinavian countries are comparatively equal as compare to the highly 
skewed Catholic countries Spain, Portugal and Italy. Indeed, it is remarkable that 
land inequality in the former Iberian colonial motherlands is just as high as in a 
average Latin American country.  It is hard to distinguish a trend in land distribution 
during the twentieth century. Most European countries started out with higher levels 
of land inequality declining a bit during the century, in spite of tendencies promoting 
land consolidation, scale economies and mechanisation.      
   9
3 Literature assessing land distribution   
 
What role does cross-country variation in land inequality play in the literature? The 
focus of this section is on regression studies that incorporated the land distribution 
variable to serve as a proxy for the initial distribution of assets and wealth. Later on, 
at the end of section 6  I will discuss the question whether land inequality estimates 
actually are a good proxy for asset inequality.       
A major benchmark in this field is the study by Alesina and Rodrik assessing 
the role of distributive politics (1994). The paper applies the median voter theorem to 
argue that higher levels of income inequality result in higher demands for income 
redistribution. The request for redistribution by the “poorer” part of the voters raises 
taxes which distort the proper functioning of markets. So initial inequality leads to 
slow growth via the political market. This argument is underpinned by empirical 
results showing that inequality in initial wealth and income is both negatively 
correlated with subsequent economic growth.9 Alesina and Rodrik derive land gini’s 
around 1960 from Taylor and Hudson (1972). Based on the same data Persson and 
Tabellini (1992) also demonstrate in an OLS framework that land inequality is 
negatively related to growth.     
Birdsall and Londono (1997) argue that the initial distribution of assets is a 
more important characteristic of the economic structure than the distribution of 
income. The asset distribution directly impacts on the economic process of resource 
allocation, whereas income merely reflects the outcome of this process.  In particular 
the initial distribution of education and land are shown to be related significantly to 
growth, outweighing the effects of initial income inequality.10 The conclusion is in 
line with the paper by Galor and Zeira (1993) in which it is argued that limited access 
of the poor to education and capital markets as a result of initial asset inequality 
constrains the growth potential (see also Galor, Moav, Vollrath 2003).     
  Research stressing the importance of asset distribution as a fundamental 
characteristic of a countries economic structure gained momentum by several papers 
based on more recent land distribution data, i.e. Deininger and Squire (1998), Li, 
Squire and Zou (1998) and Deininger and Olinto (1999). In these papers land gini’s 
around 1960 again serve as a proxy for initial asset inequality. All three papers find 
that there is a significant negative effect of historical land inequality on long run 
economic growth. In line with Birdsall and Londono (1997) the results suggest that 
the estimated negative effects of initial asset inequality on growth are much stronger 
than the estimated effects of income inequality. The insignificance of income 
inequality in growth regressions has been further underlined by panel data studies 
that report hardly any or even a slightly p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  i n c o m e  i n e q u a l i t y  o n  
growth (Barro 2000, Forbes 2000).  
If initial asset inequality matters indeed, it also raises new questions. Why 
would asset inequality impact on growth and income inequality not? In other words, 
                                                      
9 Alesina and Rodrik do not show that there is a direct positive relation between land inequality and the level of 
taxation. My own calculations show that the correlation-coefficient between land inequality and an index of the fiscal 
burden derived from ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) is negative, respectively -0,20 (1960 sample) and -0,12 
(extended sample). This resutl contradicts the prediction of the theory put forward by Alesina and Rodrik.   
10 Birdsall and Londono do not reveal the source of their land distribution data, but I guess they use the Taylor and 
Hudson data.    10
is there no relation between asset and income inequality? Perhaps, the distribution of 
land holdings around 1960 is not a good proxy for initial asset inequality? What is 
the relative weight of land in total asset distribution? Deininger and Squire (1998) 
find that the correlation-coefficient between historical land gini’s (1960’s) and current 
income gini’s (1990’s) is 0.39. (see also Deininger and Olinto 1999). The correlation-
coefficient I estimate in section 6 is even lower ranging from 0.19 to 0.23. Why is the 
correlation between initial asset inequality and subsequent income inequality so 
weak?  
From a theoretical point of view at least three effects of initial land inequality 
on subsequent income inequality can be distinguished. First, there is a direct income 
effect of the distribution of land holdings on the distribution of agricultural income. 
The extent of this effect is positively related to the share of agriculture in GDP. 
Obviously, in pre-modern economies the distribution of land holdings has a 
profound effect on income distribution which gradually declines as economies 
industrialize. 
However, investments in agricultural land may be reallocated without 
necessarily becoming redistributed. The poor need collateral assets, of which land is 
of prime importance in agricultural societies, to get access to capital loans. In a 
context of imperfect capital markets, initial land inequality can pose barriers to 
individual entrepreneurship or investments in human capital. Without government 
intervention and the supply of public goods this may lead to the persistence of asset 
and income inequality  (Galor and Zeira 1993,  De Soto 2000).   
A third, indirect, but persistent effect of land inequality on income inequality 
relates to institutions that have caused land inequality in the first place. If institutions 
responsible for high land inequality in a pre-modern agricultural society remain in 
tact during periods of fundamental structural change, the distribution of income will 
be less responsive to economic dynamics. Given the initial concentration of political 
and economic power, predatory behaviour is backed by policies suppressing 
democratic accountability and social development (Olson 2000, Hall and Jones 1999, 
Bourguignon and Verdier 2000). In the work of Engerman and Sokoloff it is 
convincingly demonstrated that in comparison to the USA and Canada the 
investment in public education and the extension of the franchise developed much 
more slowly in Latin America (Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff 2001, Mariscal and 
Sokoloff 2000).  
Theory thus predicts a strong positive relation between initial asset inequality 
and subsequent income inequality, but empirical analysis shows this relation is 
rather weak. Part of this puzzle can be resolved by looking into the historical causes 
of land distribution more carefully before we turn to the relation between land and 
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4 The determinants of land inequality: geography, factor endowments and colonial 
institutions.  
 
The various potential determinants of land distribution that can be derived from the 
literature can be roughly categorized into three factors. 1) geographic conditions or 
natural endowments, 2) factor endowments, i.e. the land-labour ratio, and 3) 
(colonial) rule and institutions. I will discuss these factors in this order.     
 
1) The feasibility to produce particular crops may impact on land distribution via the 
realisation of technical and organizational scale efficiencies. Testing the hypothesis of 
Engerman and Sokoloff that “land endowments of Latin America lent themselves to 
commodities featuring economies of scale and the use of slave labour”, Easterly concludes 
that a natural environment suitable to cash-crop production is associated with high 
levels of income inequality in the long run (Easterly 2002; pp. 3-4, Engerman and 
Sokoloff 1997). Cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, sugar, rubber and bananas can be 
produced on large land estates and may require the employment of land and capital 
intensive production methods. The coexistence of scale intensive holdings and small 
subsistence holdings skews the distribution of land. (Leamer et. al. 1999, Easterly and 
Levine 2003).   
From similar reasoning follows that specialisation in scale neutral food crops 
has an equalizing effect on the distribution of landholdings. Major foodcrops such as 
wheat and maize were historically produced on plots of modest size, whereas rice 
and millet were and are produced on very small plots of land (Hayami and Ruttan 
1985). The hypothesis that can be formulated on the basis of this argument is that 
countries with natural endowments (soil, climate, water supplies) suitable to 
growing scale intensive cash crops are likely to have higher levels of land inequality. 
Since tropical climates generally allow for a larger variety of cash crop production 
than temperate climates, the geographic position of a country on the globe may also 
affect the distribution of land.   
 
2) Relative factor endowments shape the relative cost-structure of agricultural 
production and determine its organizational constraints. Land abundance is likely to 
invoke land biased, labour saving production methods favouring crops subject to 
economies of scale. This complements the argument that qualitative land 
endowments determine the choice for crops and production methods (Easterly 2002). 
However, the land-labour ratio may also influence institutional developments.  
Domar (1970) argues that in (pre-modern) agricultural societies elites face the 
problem of recruiting sufficient labour to toil their soil. In land abundant countries 
landless labourers have an opportunity to start farming for their own at the land 
frontier. In response to conditions of labour scarcity and land abundance the 
landowning elite tends to develop coercive institutions regarding the markets for 
labour and land. Slavery and serfdom are examples of such coercive institutions 
(Domar 1970,  Demsetz 2000).  
An alternative strategy is to distribute unexploited land resources among the 
elite or specify property rights conditions in order to restrict access to land of 
smallholders and landless labourers. In land scarce, labour abundant countries on   12
the other hand elites are able to extract rents from taxes and trade margins without 
having to intervene directly into the production process. All these arguments 
support the hypothesis that low levels of labourdensity create incentives to 
redistribute land in such a way that it enhances land inequality.  
 
3) The third set of forces directly relates to colonial rule and institutional 
development. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) demonstrate that the extent 
of colonial settlement and the characteristics of colonial rule are determined in 
response to the local natural environment. In areas less favourable to colonial 
settlement, i.e. with a high disease incidence, institutions were created to extract 
agricultural or mineral resources from a distance. A strategy of predation induced 
the development of weak property rights as compared to settler colonies in which 
institutions were moulded according to the institutions in the motherland and 
directed towards accumulation of capital and skills. Indeed, the height of settler 
mortality rates during the colonial era is strongly negatively correlated with the 
quality of institutions in presently independent countries. 
Can the distribution of land be regarded as part of a colonial settlers strategy? 
Engerman and  Sokoloff (1997) argue in favour by pointing at the different style of 
colonisation in British America versus Latin America. Agriculture in British America 
became organized around a homogenous group of individual European farmers 
involved in foodcrop production (wheat) on medium-scale farms. Except for the 
slave plantations in the Southern states, the equal distribution of land was part of a 
strategy to attract European settlers to the land frontier and develop the New World. 
The Iberian colonists on the other hand basically formed a minority in a strange 
heterogeneous society. The active redistribution of land was part of their strategy to 
vest and maintain economic and political control. They developed coercive 
institutions in order to control the scarce sources of indigenous and slave labour. The 
distribution and organization of land holdings can be regarded as the result of 
“cooperative” institutions in a typical “immigrant colony” such as British America, 
and “coercive” institutions in the “settler colonies ” of Latin America.  
Yet, in areas where settler mortality rates were nearly prohibitive to 
settlement, the distribution of land was much less of an issue. In the hostile disease 
environment in West and Central Africa colonists hardly settled. In stead, the British, 
French, Belgian and Portuguese governments set up institutions to extract rents from 
natural resources via taxation (Young 1994, Manning 1988). However, in their efforts 
to raise taxes and increase exports of raw materials colonial governments made use 
of the traditional rural institutions that were in place at that time, rather than reform 
these. Given the lack of central political institutions in vastly underpopulated areas, 
the colonial rulers in fact had little alternatives than to rely on existing fragmented  
political structures to organise the collection of taxes (Stavrianos 1981, Ayittey 2005). 
Colonial institutions were devised to control from above rather than penetrate into 
the daily life and practices of production.11  
                                                      
11 Based on new estimates of historical national accounts for Africa Smits (2005) shows that, in spite of the excessive 
tax burden the agricultural GDP kept growing. In the long run however, and particularly after the severe shocks in 
terms of trade in the 1970’s, continuous taxation became a burden for further agricultural development (Smits 2005).   13
Finally, Lal (1998) points out  based on a study by Goody (1983), that the 
nature of inheritance laws may determine the distribution of land in the long run. 
Goody argues that at the time the Catholic church became institutionalised (4th 
century A.D.), it devised inheritance laws to support the accumulation of land by the 
church. The crucial rule was that only a legitimate son was entitled to inherit the land 
of his parents and in his absence the land fell to the church. Goody shows that the 
church prohibited polygamy and kinship marriages, and promoted core-family 
values placing restrictions on sexual intercourse. All these measures reduced the 
birth rate and consequently the amount of legitimate male heirs.         
Lal argues that the presence of the catholic church has added to the historical 
evolution of inequality in Latin American countries. In fact, if land inequality is 
persistent indeed, all countries in which the Catholic church has been a factor of 
importance should be characterised by comparatively high levels land inequality. 
Table A.1 reveals that apart from Latin American countries, typical Catholic 
countries in Europe such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Belgium are also 
among the most unequal.  
 
 
5 The determinants of land inequality: estimating an OLS12  
 
In this section the hypotheses developed in section 4 are analysed by means of an 
ordinary cross-country OLS. The OLS estimates the cross-country variation in the 
gini and the theil-coefficients of land holdings in the extended sample (introduced in 
section 2). The variables are listed in table A.1 and denoted as respectively 
LANDGINI and LANDTHEIL.  The estimated equation is specified as  y = α + x´ + y’ 
+ z’ + ε, in which y refers to land inequality, α is a  constant and ε is an error term 
capturing the effects of data-errors, omitted variable bias, functional misspecification 
etc. The vectors x, y and z respectively capture the effects of geographical conditions, 
relative factor endowments and colonial institutions. First the explanatory variables 
will be further clarified, followed by a correlation analysis relating the individual 
explanatory variables to land inequality (table 3), and finally the OLS results will be 
discussed (table A.3 appendix).   
 
Geographical conditions  
Comparative advantages in the production of scale intensive cash crops can be 
measured in various ways. Two crude proxies of natural suitability to tropical 
cashcrops used in literature are the absolute latitude of countries scaled between 0 
and 1 and the mean annual temperature, denoted respectively by LATITUDE and 
MEANTEMP (McArthur and Sachs 2001).   
Easterly (2002) uses indicators of land use (percentage share of land actually 
yielding a specific crop) and climatic and soil characteristics (percentage share of land 
that is suitable to growing a specific crop). The land use measure is problematic 
because of it may be endogenous to the distribution of land. The suitability of land to 
grow particular crops however is an exogenous variable. The FAO provides data on 
land suitability for SUGAR (cane), BANANAS, COTTON, RICE, MAIZE and 
                                                      
12 All the data used in the regressions can be obtained from the author in an excelfile.    14
WHEAT. For COFFEE, COCOA and RUBBER the FAO only provides land use data. 
The latter three crops are therefore included as dummy variables with a value 1 if 
countries devote more than 1% of their agricultural land in 1960 to the specific drop 
and also have a historical record as net exporter of this crop. Trade data are derived 
from Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics (2003).  
In addition I include a CASHCROP DUMMY to separate all countries that 
have a natural relative advantage in scale intensive cashcrop production from those 
that have a relative disadvantage. The dummy is set at 1 if countries produce at least 
one of the following crops, i.e. bananas, cocoa, coffee, rubber or sugar, and also have 
more than 10% of total agricultural land suitable (or actually devoted) to growing 
one or more of these five crops.     
 
Colonial factor endowments  
The ratio of labour to land, i.e. relative labour density, during the colonial era is 
estimated by taking the log of the number of inhabitants per square kilometre of 
productive land in one of three benchmark years, i.e. 1700, 1800 or 1900. This 
estimate reflects the potential (rural) labour force excluding those parts of the land 
surface covered by deserts or mountains that are not fit to cultivation. As the period 
of European settlement in other regions of the world stretches approximately from 
1500 to 1975 the main problem is to choose a year that represents relative factor 
endowments at the time colonial rule is being implemented. In New World countries 
the year 1700 or 1800 reflect colonial land-labour ratios better, whereas in African 
countries and most Asian countries the year 1900 is preferred. Obviously, such a 
flexible measure just provides a crude indication of relative factor endowments 
colonial settlers faced, but it precludes the effects of the world wide demographic 
transition in the twentieth century. Moreover, the lion-share of the variation in 
relative factor endowments is related to spatial rather than temporal variation. 
Square kilometres of agricultural area are from Taylor and Hudson (1972: pp. 303-
305) and population estimates for 1700, 1800 and 1900 are from Mcevedy and Jones 
(1978). The variable is denoted as LABOURDENSITY.  
 
Colonial institutions 
Acemoglu et.al. (2001) use the log of historical settler mortality rates as a proxy for 
settler conditions. In this paper the variable SETMORT is specified in the quadratic 
form to account for the distinction between areas with favourable settler conditions 
and areas with the most favourable settler conditions. Indeed the latter became in 
fact immigrant colonies rather than settler colonies, with a relatively equal 
distribution of land and a marginalised indigenous population.   
The impact of the ethnic composition of countries on institutional 
development and the distribution of land as such can not be represented by the 
commonly used indicator of ethnic fractionalisation, since this measure does not 
account for the distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous people, which is  
crucial.  Therefore a dummy is included with a value 1 subject to two conditions: at 
least 10% of the population is of former European origin and at least 20% of the 
population is of either indigenous or non-European origin. I denote this variable as   15
the CREOLE DUMMY. Data on ethnic composition are derived from CIA World 
Factbook. 
The impact of the Catholic church on the distribution of land is captured by 
taking the log of the percentage share of the population that is considered to adhere 
to Catholicism in or close to the year 1965 (Taylor and Hudson 1972). The variable is 
denoted by CATHOLICISM65.  
 
In Table 3 pairwise correlation-coefficients of the explanatory variables with the two 
indicators of land inequality are reported. These figures provide a first indication of 
the relative importance of natural endowments, factor endowments and colonial 
institutions as well as a check whether signs are in line with the formulated 
hypotheses.  
 
Table 3: Correlation of land inequality    
 
 LANDGINI  LANDTHEIL 
LATITUDE -0,01  -0,11 
MEANTEMP -0,03  0,05 
    
CASHCROP Dummy  0,32  0,38 
BANANAS 0,20  0,24 
COCOA Dummy  0,12  0,13 
COFFEE Dummy  0,25  0,31 
RICE -0,17  -0,11 
RUBBER Dummy  -0,13  -0,13 
SUGAR 0,23  0,27 
WHEAT 0,00  -0,05 
    
LABOURDENSITY -0,40  -0,36 
SETMORT -0,26  -0,22 
CREOLE Dummy  0,44  0,48 
CATHOLICISM65 0,46  0,46 
 
Consistent with the expectation the cashcrop dummy is positively associated with 
land inequality. This aggregate variable scores better than the individual crop 
variables, which does not surprise. Countries with a natural environment suitable to 
growing sugarcane, bananas and coffee display higher levels of land inequality, 
whereas conditions favouring food crops such as rice obtain lower levels of land 
inequality. The latter does not apply to conditions favourable to producing wheat. 
Growing rubber, a typical scale intensive cashcrop, is contrary to the expectation, 
negatively associated to land inequality. Most interesting is perhaps the conclusion 
that absolute latitude (i.e. distance to the equator) and mean annual temperature do 
hardly correlate with land inequality. The expectation that tropical climates are better 
fit to the production of agricultural commodities subject to economies of scale 
polarizing land distribution cannot be confirmed.  
The non-geographic variables all show a stronger correlation with land 
inequality. Except for settler mortality, which is not yet specified in the hypothesized 
quadratic form (as it will be in the regression equation), labourdensity, the creole 
dummy and the spread of catholicism correlate relatively well and have the sign as   16
expected. So at first glance the specific characteristics of colonial settlement make 
more of a difference in terms of land distribution, than geography related factors. 
Does the same picture emerge from the multiple regression analysis?        
 
Table A.3 in the appendix shows the results. It should be noted in advance that the 
results refer to both samples (gini and theil) and that regressions 1 to 3 are more 
restricted in terms of number of observations because of the simple reason that 
estimates of settler mortality rates are scarce and also only apply to former colonial 
countries. In regression 4 to 6 this variable is excluded raising the number of 
observations and including countries without a colonial heritage.  
  The null-hypothesis that the feasibility of cashcrop production does not have 
a significant impact on the distribution of land is rejected in all specifications at the 
95% confidence level. Cash-crops inhibiting economies of scale are positively 
associated to land inequality. When individual cash-crops such as sugar, coffee or 
bananas are included this significance disappears. Rice is the only individual crop 
that is relatively robust and significantly negatively related to land inequality. Other 
foodcrops such as wheat, maize and millet are completely insignificant. Changes in 
the composition of the equation and the sample (gini or theil) do not affect the 
cashcrop dummy variable very much.    
  Relative factor endowments also play a role in determining the historical 
distribution of land as was expected. Land abundant countries are characterised by 
higher levels of land inequality than labour abundant countries and this result is 
significant at the 95% confidence level except for the theil regression no. 3, which is 
significant at 90%. The question that is left unanswered however concerns the nature 
of causality. Does land abundance invoke the production of cashcrops or does it 
invoke intervention by the (colonial) elites in land and labour markets, irrespective of 
the type of crop produced?  
The first explanation does not rule out the second and vice versa, on the 
contrary, but it is interesting to test the correlation between historical land 
abundance (i.e. the inverse of labourdensity) and the extent of cashcrop specialisation 
in the twentieth century (around 1960). Following the same methods and data 
employed in constructing dummy variables for cocoa, coffee and rubber, I 
constructed dummies for specialisation in bananas and sugar.  
 
 
Table 5:  Correlation of land endowments  
 
  Bananas  Cocoa  Coffee  Rubber  Sugar  Coffee + Sugar 
Landabundance  0,06  0,14 0,26 -0,20 0,31  0,34 
 
The results presented in table 5 give a mixed picture. The relation between land 
endowments and the production of bananas and cocoa appears to be weak, whereas 
rubber is produced more in labourabundant areas. Sugar and coffee however clearly 
do better in landabundant countries. The aggregate of the Coffee and Sugar dummy 
has a correlation-coefficient of 0,34.         17
Crop and factor endowments both play a substantial role in explaining levels 
of land inequality and there is also some modest evidence that initial factor 
endowments have determined long run specialisation in crops. Whereas the above 
analysis confirms the relation between factor endowments, crops and land 
distribution, there is no evidence at all for a causal relation between tropics, crops 
and land distribution. Perhaps the influence of a tropical climate on the distribution 
of land runs via settler conditions?  
 
The regression analysis does not reject the hypothesis that the extent and nature of 
colonial settlement have shaped the institutions guiding the markets for land and 
agricultural labour. In colonies with favourable settler conditions distinctive patterns 
o f  l a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  h a v e  d e v e l o p e d .  D i r e c t  f a c t o r  m a r k e t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  s e t t l e r  
colonies employing a substantial pool of indigenous labour (creole dummy) have 
lead to high levels of land inequality in general. The significance of the quadratic 
form of the settler mortality variable and the creole dummy demonstrate that in 
North America, where settler mortality rates were lowest, land was distributed more 
equally. European immigrants vested themselves among “equals” and employed 
their own labour force in food producing family farms. The regression results indeed 
support the historical analysis of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2001, 2005).  
In areas where colonial settlement was difficult because of a hostile natural 
environment resource extraction was based on taxation. This pattern is characteristic 
for large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in general and West and Central Africa in 
particular. In the latter region land inequality is relatively mild reflecting the 
persistence of traditional pre-colonial rural institutions that colonial governments 
(ab)used to collect taxes (Stavrianos 1981). In the next section I will argue that these 
“extractive” institutions, rather than initial asset inequality in the form of land 
inequality, explain high levels of income inequality in most West and Central African 
countries.13  
The hypothesis, as argued by Lal a.o., that the presence of the catholic church 
has contributed to land inequality can be reconfirmed on the basis of the analysis 
presented here, in particular in the regressions with more observations incorporating 
European countries. Since, the settler mortality variable restricts the sample size to 
colonised countries in regression 1-3, regressions 4-6 present a better check for the 
significance of the variables that are not specificly related to a colonial past. Indeed, 
the spread of catholicism is significant at a 95% confidence level in the specifications 
excluding settler mortality.  
  Crops, factor endowments, settler conditions and the characteristics of   
colonial rule all play a role in assessing the variation in land inequality across 
                                                      
13 In my opinion the discussion of “developmental” versus “extractive” institutions in Acemoglu et.al. (2001) should 
be nuanced at two points. First, in so far colonial settlement led to extraordinary forms of land inequality which 
persistently influenced the distribution of assets and income after decolonisation, the relation between favourable 
settler conditions and “developmental” institutions is at least ambiguous. And second, colonial institutions in Sub 
Saharan Africa were not problematic because they ruined the traditional production patterns during colonial times 
(as suggested on page 137). They were problematic because they were founded on a centralised governance structure 
that did not exist before. This “control structure” was used in first instance to employ traditional rural institutions to 
collect taxes, and only in the post-colonial era central governments used it to dismantle or destroy traditional rural 
institutions in order to redistribute political influence to the level of the national state (Ayittey 2005, Smits 2005).       
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countries. A typical “unequal” country is a land abundant catholic country whose 
geographic conditions support the production of coffee and sugar more than the 
production of rice, which has comparatively favourable settler conditions, such that a 
minority of white settlers were to dominate a labour force of indigenous people and 
African slaves. Such a description indeed comes remarkably close to an “average” 
Latin American country. This pattern is however tested for a sample covering all 
regions in the world. Whether either geography, or endowments, or colonial 
institutions matters most is impossible to say on the basis of this analysis. More 
important at this stage of analysis however is the observation that the large variation 
in land inequality as well as the complex set of explanatory factors accounting for 
this spatial pattern, implies that “the initial conditions of inequality” are diverse.         
 
 
6 Initial land inequality and current income inequality  
 
In this section the relation between initial land inequality and income inequality in 
the 1990’s is investigated. First I discuss the correlation between land and income 
inequality and the data I used to estimate this relationship. Subsequently hypotheses 
and variables will be specified, followed by a discussion of the regression results 
(which are shown in table A.4 in the appendix).    
 
6.1 relating land and income distribution: first impressions 
In section 3 the potential effects of land inequality on subsequent income inequality 
were briefly discussed and placed in three categories: (1) the direct effect of land 
distribution on agricultural income distribution, (2) the barriers that initial asset and 
wealth inequality might pose to access capital-markets and education a.o., and (3) the 
persistency of institutions devised to maintain the distributional status quo and  slow 
down processes of democratisation and civil emancipation.  
However, it is was also pointed out that these effects are likely to become 
weaker over time as countries forge ahead. The direct income effect naturally 
diminishes as the share of agricultural income in total national income declines. And 
the latter two effects can also be off-set in the transformation process from a 
traditional rural society towards an urban industrial society. Institutions and 
governments are forced to respond to new technologies, media and a growing class 
of industrial entrepreneurs, which give new support to the voice of people 
demanding for security and mobility. The redistribution of income, assets and wealth 
generally receives broad attention as a political theme in transforming societies. So 
there are various reasons to expect that the relation between land inequality and 
income inequality is stronger in less-developed agricultural societies rather than 
modern industrial democratic societies.  
What does a correlation analysis show? Deininger and Squire (1998) have 
calculated the correlation coefficient for a sample of land gini’s and income gini’s and 
reported  a figure of 0.39 (see also Deininger and Olinto 2001). Their analysis shows 
that initial land inequality and income inequality is positively related, but correlation   19
is moderate. The estimates presented here in table 6 (in the first and second column) 
turn out to be even lower ranging from 0,19 to 0,23.14    
These estimates are based on the gini and theil-coefficients from table A.1 and 
a sample of income gini’s derived from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID 
version 1.0). The income inequality sample I constructed consists of high-quality 
gini-coefficients with a national coverage for the latest year available in the period 
1987-1998.15 The available and accepted observations create a sample of 88 
observations for which also land gini’s are available. This sample can be extended to 
95 observations by releasing some restrictions.16    
 
 
Table 6: Correlation of land and income inequality 
 
  INCOME GINI 1990  INCOME GINI 1990  INCOME GINI 1990 excl. AFRICA 
  95 observations  88 observations  76 observations* 
LANDGINI   0,19   0,19   0,49 
LANDTHEIL   0,235   0,22   0,52 
* 95 -  19 Sub Saharan African observations 
 
In the third column of table 6 the correlation of land and income inequality is 
estimated excluding all 19 Sub Saharan African countries. It shows that excluding 
Sub Saharan Africa raises the correlation coefficient with approximately 30 
percentage points from 0,19-0,23 towards 0,49-0,52! This is really surprising! Since 
most countries in Africa are good examples of the underdeveloped agricultural 
societies in which the share of agriculture in GDP is still large.  Indeed, wouldn’t we  
expect to find a strong relation between the distribution of land holdings and the 
distribution of income especially in these African countries? 
  In East and South African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia land became highly unequally distributed during 
colonial times and still is. Farmers of European descent own large estates, which are 
often held responsible by current governments for persisting economic inequality in 
these countries.17 The relatively egalitarian distribution of land in the majority of 
West and Central African countries however is not consistent with the exorbitant gap 
between rich and poor observed by income gini’s. I argue in line with Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson that land inequality estimates reveal additional evidence for 
                                                      
14 The different results reported in this paper versus Deininger and Squire (1998) and Deininger and Olinto (2001) is 
likely to be the result of differences in land inequality estimates (see section 2) as well as differences in the sample 
selection of the income inequality data. 
15 The following rules are further applied: income gini’s are preffered over expenditure gini’s, net income over gross 
income estimates and household income over personal income estimates. For ca. half of the countries only 
expenditure gini’s are available for the 1990’s, which are increased with 5 percentage points to correct for potential 
underestimation of actual income inequality.15 I did not correct for gross to net income or personal to household 
income.  In case there was more than one suitable estimate to choose from, or in case estimates differed more than 5 
percentage points within the given period, the average is calculated and included.  
16 Additionaly included countries are: Argentina and Uruguay with an income gini for Urban population, Barbados 
with an income gini for 1979, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago and Cyprus with a low-quality income gini which 
makes sense, and finally Mozambique with an income gini derived from the CIA (2005) World Fact Book, 
(www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/).     
17 This situation is used by Zimbabwian president Mugabe to gain political support for his land reform policy.    20
the hypothesis that unfavourable settler conditions induced extractive institutions, 
which are responsible for high levels of income inequality. 
Extractive institutions concentrated on mineral resources rather than 
agricultural products. Lucrative trade was thrived in gold, diamonds, ivory and 
slaves during colonial times and during the twentieth century trade shifted towards 
crude petrol and metals. Tax schemes are also exemplary for the “weak” institutional 
environment in many African countries. These taxes depress agricultural profits and 
investments disadvantaging the rural population in favour of the politically more 
influential urban population (Krueger, Schiff and Valdez 1991, Cheru 2002).  
Putting the results together it can be argued that there are quite distinct 
historical patterns of inequality. The distribution of land in Latin America has (had) a 
long run impact on the income distribution, since large estate holders had their 
stakes in agricultural rents and prevent(ed) access of landless peasants to abundant 
land resources. In West and Central Africa higher access to land did not translate into 
more equality of economic opportunities however. Income inequality in these 
countries must be seen in the light of the elite’s control over mineral resources and  
taxation systems biased against the rural population. Let’s test this hypothesis. 
 
6.2 estimating OLS regressions of income inequality 
The initial distribution of land holdings is not a sufficient neither a necessary initial 
condition of inequality. Variables capturing the extent of “extractive” institutions 
should be included to obtain a more efficient model explaining income inequality.  
         The variable LANDINEQUALITY accounts for the long run impact of initial 
asset and wealth inequality. Since the regressions are hardly influenced by 
substituting gini- for theil-coefficients, only the results for the landgini’s are 
presented here. The log of GDP per capita in 1990 is included as an interaction term 
to allow for the fact that the effects of land inequality decline over time as economies 
mature. This variable is denoted as GDPPC90 and derived from Maddison (2003).      
The role of mineral resource extraction is captured by so-called point-source 
estimates of natural resources derived from Isham et.al. (2003). The estimate consists 
of the log of the percentage share in total exports of the one specific mineral 
(sometimes two) dominating a countries export package. Countries with a diversified 
agricultural or manufacturing export packages are given the value 0.18 Mineral 
resources include crude petrol, gas, coal, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, ivory, 
diamonds, pearls and wood. Isham et.al also consider agricultural products such as 
sugar, cotton, coffee, cocoa etc. as part of a point-source exports structure. However, 
since the impact of these products on income inequality is likely to be captured by 
the land inequality variable, I excluded the crops. Therefore the variable denoted as 
MINERALS only refers to the relative dominance in exports of mining products and 
wood (i.e. forests are excluded from land distribution data).  
The hypothesis is that the presence of mineral resources creates incentives 
and opportunities for rent-seeking and monopolistic behaviour by the political elites. 
In this context income inequality is likely to be high. Obviously, the effect of mineral 
resource abundance on income inequality will be stronger in countries in which 
                                                      
18 Three missing observations for Guinea, Guyana and Libya were included on the basis of UN Trade Statistics.   21
extractive institutions are in place and property rights are insecure. Therefore the 
MINERALS variable is interacted with a variable capturing the risk of expropriation, 
i.e. the same as Acemoglu et.al. use to represent extractive institutions. The variable 
is denoted as RISKEXPROP90, refers to the year 1990 and is derived from the PRS 
Group International Countries Risk Guide (ICRG).         
To account for the extent of persistency in institutions that control the 
distribution of assets and income I included a measure of democratic accountability. 
Path dependency in inequality depends on rational human calculations: those who 
are in power do not want to give up their privileges and therefore have no incentives 
to held themselves accountable. The index of democratic accountability is from the 
ICRG, again for the year 1990, denoted as DEMOCRACY90. The sign is expected to 
be negative. And finally, a variable denoted as SOCIALIST DUMMY represents the 
expectation that a (former) socialist government has had an equalizing impact on the 
income distribution.   
 
The regression results are presented in table A.4 (appendix). Each regression is 
estimated for both income inequality samples (respectively 95 and 88 observations). 
  The overall picture that emerges from these regressions is that once we 
control for the institutional variables and the presence of mineral resources in 
countries, the relation between initial land inequality and subsequent income 
inequality appears to be very strong. When controlling for the level of economic 
development (interacting land inequality with GDP per capita), the significance and 
explanatory power of the land gini increases enormously. The R-squared jumps from 
0,04 in regression 1 immediately to 0,44 in regression 2. The level of significance of 
the landgini is also very high, with t-statistics in regression 2-6 varying from 3.86 to 
8.32! In all these regressions the null-hypothesis that land inequality has no impact 
on income inequality must be rejected with a probability of more than 99%.    
The dummy variable controlling for (former) socialist states and the index of 
democratic accountability is significant in all regressions at a 95% confidence level. 
The presence of minerals interacting with the risk of expropriation is significantly 
positively related to income inequality. In high risk countries the people who are in 
charge can easily subtract the windfall gains that mineral resource exploitation 
generate.       
  In sum, the regression results leave little doubts concerning the lasting impact 
of land inequality on income inequality. Yet, the distribution of land is perhaps the 
most important, but certainly not a comprehensive factor of initial asset distribution. 
In so far inequality plays a role in economic development and growth, the historical 
sources of income inequality should be acknowledged. These include land 
inequality, but also the dangerous combination of extractive institutions and mineral 
resource abundance. Studies incorporating a variable of initial asset inequality that is 
solely based on land distribution, do not only miss part of the picture, but are also 
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7 Land inequality and economic development in Latin America  
 
Exploring the causes and consequences of land distribution in a more or less 
quantitative and systematic manner as done in this paper reveals strong support for 
literature stressing the role of the historical roots and structural factors accounting 
for temporal rigidity in income inequality levels. But do these factors also affect 
economic development? A brief afterthought on Latin America. 
  Explaining the differences in growth performance in New World countries is  
a leading theme in the work of Engerman and Sokoloff (2001, 2005). They show that 
Latin American institutions have persistently restricted access to economic 
opportunities to substantial parts of the population. Initial inequality in social status 
(position of slaves and indigenous people), assets and wealth (land, natural 
resources) has (had) a long lasting effect since the political incentive structure is 
characterized by maintaining the status quo and rent seeking behaviour. The slow 
democratization process restricted peoples political participation. Progress in public 
education has been much slower than in North America, which restricted the 
opportunities to acquire literacy, skills and develop human networks. Systematic 
underinvestment in public goods went hand in hand with tax systems benefiting the 
elites rather than lower income classes.  
  Complementary literature stresses that the polarised agricultural sector 
created unbalanced economic growth characterized by suboptimal spill-over effects. 
The coexistence of minifundias and latifundias generated insufficient technology and 
demand spill-overs to support a sustained process of industrialization (Kay 2001, 
Johnson 1991). Fei and Ranis (1997) describe in detail how backward and forward 
linkages between agriculture and industry remain underdeveloped in case of 
unbalanced agricultural technical change. Murphy, Sleifer and Vishny (1989) point 
out that inequality reduces the domestic demand for basic manufacturing products 
because middle-classes are thin. Meanwhile the elites engaged in conspicuous 
consumption spend their capital on imported luxury goods. Low domestic demand 
for basic manufactures impeded domestic industrialisation.  
Inequality obviously has its disadvantages for economic development, yet it 
did not kill the growth in Latin America! On the contrary, from 1870 to 1929 and 
from 1950 to 1973 the majority of Latin American countries witnessed favourable 
rates of growth which matched developments in the West (Maddison 2003). The true 
question therefore seems to be why Latin American development got stuck 
somewhere halfway? The analysis of land distribution reveals some important clues, 
which by no means substitute for other explanations, but can be seen as 
complementary.  
In most Latin American countries coercive land and labour market 
institutions were created in order to tackle the problems that the Iberian settlers had 
with a situation of chronic labor scarcity. This situation existed at least until the start 
of the twentieth century. Already shortly after the Second World War this situation 
had turned around almost completely, as the informal sector starts to expand 
rapidly. There is no other region in the world that witnessed such a rapid 
transformation from a context of labour scarcity towards a context of a sustained 
labour surplus.     23
  Colonial settlers responded to labour scarcity by dividing the land and 
restricting the access to land of indigenous peasants. In addition the estate holders 
introduced labour-saving technological and organizational changes (Hayami and 
Ruttan 1985). This created the paradoxical situation that in spite of large supplies of 
land, the absorptive capacity of the agricultural sector in terms of jobs and land for 
new farms was greatly reduced. meanwhile the demographic transition set in. Rapid 
urbanization is a stylized fact of Latin American economic development. Indeed, the 
new generations settled down in the cities. However, formal urban manufacturing 
and service industries did not provide sufficient jobs to prevent the formation of 
large informal sectors with underemployed people. One wonders why there has 
never been a process of de-urbanization or re-agriculturalization in countries that are 





In this paper new data on land distribution are used to explore the causes and 
consequences of land inequality. The two central questions addressed are 1) what 
explains the historical cross-country variation in land distribution? 2) how does 
initial land inequality relate to present-day income inequality? 
Historical land distribution could be explained dependent by the interaction 
between local endowments and the strategic responses of colonial powers. The 
conditions of settlement had large consequences for the way in which colonists 
extracted rents from their colony. In regions with high settler mortality rates, the 
colonial motherland necessarily adopted a strategy of resource extraction at a 
distance. In regions with favourable settler climates a direct exploitation of land, 
labour and mineral resources was feasible.  
Direct involvement in the production process required intervention in factor 
markets. This colonial intervention affected the distribution of land directly, in 
particular if labour was scarce and land abundant. In this case coercive institutions 
such as slavery and serfdom were pursued to control the scarce so valuable sources 
of labour. In areas without such sources of indigenous labour, the exploitation of the 
land relied on European immigrants. In these immigrant colonies institutional 
development was rather “cooperative” than “coercive”. In those areas where settler 
mortality rates prohibited settlement institutions can be best denoted as “extractive” 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001). Colonial strategies focusing on mineral 
resource extraction, either via trade or taxation, did not require direct intervention in 
land markets and left traditional rural institutions in tact.  
Local geographic conditions co-determined the feasibility of colonial 
settlements and strategies. In particular regions with land suitable to the production 
of sugar and coffee attracted settlers who started large scale capital intensive 
plantations. On the other hand, in countries with land fit to grow rice, a labour-
intensive and scale neutral foodcrop, land holdings became less polarised. 
Geography thus created a potential context for land inequality. But there is no 
relation whatsoever between a tropical climate and land inequality.        24
These determinants together explain a good share of the variation in land 
inequality between Iberian and British America, between West and East Africa or 
between Latin America and East Asia. However, these determinants become even 
more important when we try to explain the variation in income inequality levels 
across countries that can be observed at present.  
High levels of land inequality result in p e r s i s t e n t  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  i n c o m e  
inequality. Particularly when initial land inequality is controlled for the level of 
economic development the factor land turns out to be of prime significance. 
However, land inequality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient initial condition of 
inequality. The contrast between West Africa and Latin America tells an interesting 
story in this respect.  
Both regions are characterised by persistent high levels of income inequality. 
In Latin America persistent income inequality is rooted in factor market intervention 
and the development of coercive institutions during three centuries of colonial rule. 
The roots of West African income inequality on the other hand reside in the 
monopolisation of mineral resources and tax systems that systematically repress 
agricultural smallholders in favour of the urban population. The origins of a high 
risk of expropriation and an unequally divided fiscal burden stem from the 
extractive institutions that were created by the central colonial government. Both 
regions share the burden of political inflexibility that are characteristic of countries 
with high levels of initial asset inequality. Those in power want to hold on to what 
they have and feel threatened by requests for democratic accountability. In both 
regions initial asset inequality has probably retarded economic development, but the 
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Table A.1: The distribution of land holdings by country, 20th century 
 
 








1 Algeria  1930 59,6  0,326     
2 Algeria  1973 63,5  0,327     
3 Argentina  1914 80,3  0,648     
4 Argentina  1947 80,6  0,648     
5  Argentina  1960  81,4 0,667  86,7 85,6 
6 Argentina  1988 81,4  0,645     
7 Australia  1910 73,4  0,489     
8 Australia  1924 67,6  0,376     
9  Australia  1960  82,0 0,651  88,2 85,3 
10 Australia  1971  80,5  0,612     
11 Austria  1930  68,4  0,408     
12  Austria  1960  67,1 0,386  70,7 68,8 
13 Austria  1990  61,2  0,314     
14 Bangladesh  1960     41,8 
15 Bangladesh  1977  41,7  0,138     
16 Barbados  1961  81,6  0,795     
17 Barbados  1989  84,8  0,804     
18 Belgium  1930  75,9  0,544     
19  Belgium  1959  60,0 0,276  60,4  
20 Belgium  1970  57,8  0,255     
21 Bolivia  1960     76,8 
22 Brazil  1920  78,0  0,592     
23  Brazil  1960  78,7 0,608  84,5 84,1 
24 Brazil  1985  80,2  0,632     
25 Burkina  Faso  1993  39,1  0,112     
26 Cameroon  1972  40,7  0,120     
27 Canada  1931  48,7  0,183     
28 Canada  1961  52,6  0,212    55,1 
29  Central African Rep.  1974  33,8  0,082     
30 Chile  1927  83,7  0,746     
31 Chile  1965  86,5  0,823     
32 Chile  1997  84,1  0,752     
33 China  1997  43,8  0,179     
34  Colombia  1960  80,5 0,644  86,4 82,9 
35 Colombia  1988  74,3  0,493     
36  Congo, dem. rep (Zaire)  1970  53,2  0,261     
37 Cote  d'Ivoire  1974  41,5  0,128    42,3 
38  Costa  Rica  1963  73,9 0,495  78,2 80,6 
39 Cyprus  1960     62,0   30
40 Cyprus  1985  59,8  0,289     
41 Czechoslovakia  1921  63,3  0,329     
42 Denmark  1919  52,2  0,204     
43 Denmark  1933  47,5  0,176     
44  Denmark  1959  44,2 0,141  45,8 43,0 
45 Denmark  1989  42,8  0,138     
46  Dominican  Republic  1960  74,5 0,542  80,3  
47  Ecuador  1954  80,4 0,671  86,4 84,0 
48 Ecuador  1974  77,2  0,552     
49 Egypt  1915  73,0  0,538     
50 Egypt  1930  70,3  0,485     
51  Egypt  1961  63,3 0,343  67,4 54,9 
52  El  Salvador  1961  78,3 0,624  82,7 82,1 
53 Estonia  1925  42,1  0,126     
54 Ethiopia  1977  42,4  0,135     
55 Finland  1929  39,2  0,091     
56  Finland  1959  33,8 0,084  35,1 49,4 
57 France    1930  62,9  0,317     
58 France  1963  50,2  0,187    54,4 
59 France  1988  54,6  0,226     
60 Gabon  1974  40,2  0,133     
61 Germany  1907  70,4  0,433     
62 Germany  1925  70,5  0,431     
63  Germany, fed. rep  1960  52,4  0,211  66,8  55,4 
64  Germany, fed. rep  1971  49,4  0,178     
65 Ghana  1970  53,0  0,226     
66 Greece  1971  47,0  0,166    45,4 
67 Greece  1993  53,9  0,226     
68 Guadeloupe  1969  60,0  0,323     
69  Guatemala  1950    86,0   
70 Guatemala  1964  77,0  0,601    85,3 
71 Guinea    1989  45,2  0,151     
72 Guyana  1989  63,9  0,399     
73 Haiti  1971  46,2  0,170     
74  Honduras  1952  70,6 0,461  75,7 76,5 
75 Honduras  1993  65,3  0,420     
76  India  1960  56,6 0,294  52,2 61,4 
77 India  1986  57,9  0,252     
78 Indonesia  1963  52,7  0,265    55,5 
79 Indonesia  1973  47,1  0,202     
80 Indonesia  1993  45,4  0,180     
81  Iran  1960    62,5  62,3 
82 Iran  1988  67,7  0,375     
83  Iraq  1958  82,0 0,673  88,2 72,6 
84 Ireland  1930  55,3  0,234     
85  Ireland  1960  57,5 0,254  59,4  
86 Israel  1970  69,8  0,468    80,0 
87 Italy  1930  71,5  0,471     
88  Italy  1960  62,0 0,345  73,2 74,3 
89 Italy  1990  73,3  0,500     
90  Jamaica  1961  75,7 0,580  77,0 80,3 
91 Japan  1909  40,0  0,126     
92 Japan  1930  39,0  0,118     
93  Japan  1960  39,8 0,108  47,0 43,2 
94 Japan  1980  50,3  0,139     
95 Japan  1995  51,1  0,205     
96 Jordan  1983  64,3  0,348    67,7 
97  Kenya  1960  76,2 0,589  69,2 75,0 
98 Kenya  1974  63,1  0,374     
99  Korea,  rep.  1961    38,7  34,0 
100 Korea,  rep.  1970  30,7  0,078     
101 Korea,  rep.  1990  37,2  0,103       31
102 Kuwait  1970  72,5  0,456     
103 Laos  1998  38,2  0,107     
104 Latvia  1925  50,4  0,191     
105 Lesotho  1960  38,1  0,123     
106 Lesotho  1990  41,1  0,144     
107 Liberia  1971  68,1  0,441     
108  Libya  1960    70,0   
109 Lithuania  1930  44,0  0,144     
110  luxembourg  1950    63,8   
111 Madagascar  1960     80,4 
113  Malaysia  1960  68,0 0,454  47,3 64,0 
114  Mali  1960  45,1 0,156  47,7 47,8 
115  Malta  1960  50,2 0,189  47,8  
116 Mauritius  1930  74,2  0,659     
117  Mexico    1960    69,4  60,7 
118 Morocco  1962  57,7  0,263     
119 Mozambique  1999  36,8  0,108     
120 Myanmar  1993  46,3  0,163    44,3 
121 Nepal  1971  54,2  0,280     
122 Netherlands  1921  66,2  0,310     
123 Netherlands  1930  56,8  0,249     
124  Netherlands  1959  55,7 0,236  57,9 50,5 
125 New  Zealand  1910  78,6  0,589     
126 New  Zealand  1918  77,6  0,525     
127 New  Zealand  1930  76,2  0,527     
128  New  Zealand  1960  69,6 0,437  73,4 76,4 
129 New  Zealand  1972  71,2  0,468     
130  Nicaragua  1963  75,9 0,528  80,1  
131 Niger  1980  31,2  0,070     
132 Norway  1929  60,0  0,282     
133  Norway  1959  36,2 0,098  67,6 39,1 
134  Pakistan  1961  44,7 0,166  65,0 55,6 
135 Pakistan  1989  55,0  0,244     
136  Panama  1960  69,9 0,429  73,5 80,4 
137 Panama  1990  82,2  0,655     
138 Paraguay  1961  86,3  0,849    85,7 
139 Paraguay  1991  84,9  0,803     
140  Peru  1961  85,4 0,818  93,3 92,3 
141 Peru  1994  81,1  0,714     
142 Philippines  1950  48,2  0,220     
143  Philippines  1960  48,8 0,195  53,4 56,0 
144 Philippines  1991  54,7  0,238     
145  Poland  1960  51,1 0,204  46,5  
146 Portugal  1968  75,6  0,554    71,8 
147 Portugal  1989  73,5  0,527     
148 Puerto  Rico  1930  69,9  0,469     
149  Puerto  Rico  1959  70,7 0,468  73,8  
150 Puerto  Rico  1987  73,4  0,504     
151 Reunion  1972  63,4  0,377     
152 Romania  1930  43,3  0,183     
153 Saudi  Arabia  1972  74,2  0,513     
154 Senegal  1960  46,7  0,162    49,3 
155 Senegal  1998  47,8  0,173     
156 Sierra  Leone  1970  42,4  0,131     
157 Singapore  1973  29,1  0,081     
159 Slovenia  1991  56,2  0,236     
160 South  Africa  1927  62,8  0,323     
161  South  Africa  1960  64,3 0,336  70,0  
162  Spain  1960  79,1 0,610  79,7 84,5 
163 Spain  1989  80,2  0,636     
164 Sri  Lanka  1961  62,3  0,358    65,7 
165 Swaziland  1971  83,5  0,776       32
166 Sweden  1919  57,3  0,246     
167  Sweden  1961  48,8 0,182  50,6 45,6 
168 Switzerland  1929  54,3  0,230     
169 Switzerland  1969  50,4  0,192    50,0 
170 Syria  1971  64,3  0,338     
171 Taiwan    1920  53,9  0,227     
172  Taiwan    1960  39,0 0,136  46,3  
173 Tanzania  1960     79,0 
174  Thailand  1963  44,4 0,145  46,0 42,6 
175 Thailand  1993  44,7  0,154     
176 Togo  1961  45,2  0,150     
177 Togo  1970  51,0  0,206     
178  Trinidad  and  Tobago  1963  69,1 0,446  69,1  
179 Tunisia  1961  61,6  0,314    64,6 
180 Turkey  1927  56,3  0,256     
181  Turkey (in deunums)  1960  60,8  0,294  59,2  59,5 
182 Turkey  1991  58,5  0,274     
183 Uganda  1963  48,1  0,176    54,9 
184 Uganda  1991  57,4  0,277     
185  UK (England and Wales)  1921  62,6  0,308     
186 UK  (Scotland)  1925  64,6  0,327     
187  UK (Northern Ireland)  1925  58,9  0,269     
188  UK  1960  68,7 0,399  72,3 67,7 
189 UK  1993  64,4  0,340     
190 Uruguay  1937  77,5  0,563     
191  Uruguay  1960  79,1 0,591  82,6 81,3 
192 USA  1910  57,1  0,253     
193 USA  1930  60,1  0,305     
194  USA  1959  67,7 0,411  71,0 73,1 
195 USA  1987  71,9  0,456     
196  Venezuela  1956    90,9  91,7 
197 Venezuela  1961  85,7  0,819     
198  Vietnam  (South)  1960  56,2 0,253  58,7  
199 Vietnam  1994  47,4  0,184    
200  Yugoslavia  1950    43,7   
201 Zambia  1971  69,9  0,476     
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Table A.2:  Calculation example of a gini- and theil-coefficient of land distribution 
(Chile 1965)  
 
The gini- and theil-coefficients of land distribution are compiled from tables that 
have divided the total number of farm-holdings into land size classes, measured by 
hectares per holding (step 1). From these tables a decile distribution can be obtained 
(step 2). The decile distribution serves as input into the formula for the gini- and 
theil-coefficient (step 3).  
 
step 1  number of holdings  total area in hectares  Average size per holding 
less than 1 ha  51.000  22.000  0,43 
1 to 2 ha  34.699  46.100  1,33 
2 to 5 ha  43.761  138.500  3,16 
5 to 10 ha  33.076  230.300  6,96 
10 to 20 ha  29.976  413.800  13,80 
20 to 50 ha  29.360  911.900  31,06 
50 to 100 ha  14.785  1.022.500  69,16 
100 to 200 ha  9.164  1.261.500  137,66 
200 to 500 ha  6.998  2.167.500  309,73 
500 to 1000 ha  3.156  2.143.400  679,15 
1000 ha and over  3.324  22.286.230  6704,64 
total   259.299  30.643.730  118,18 
     
step 2  Decile distribution of holdings   Decile distribution of land  Distribution in percentages  
1st decile     25930  11185  0,000365 
2nd decile    25930  11957  0,000390 
3rd decile     25930  34450  0,001124 
4th decile  25930  67543  0,002204 
5th decile  25930  82788  0,002702 
6th decile  25930  180544  0,005892 
7th decile  25930  310357  0,010128 
8th decile  25930  615528  0,020087 
9th decile  25930  1243425  0,040577 
10th decile  25930  28085952  0,916532 
Total 259300  30643730  1,00 
 
Source: FAO, Report on the World Census of Agriculture 1960, Table 1.4, 2.3 and 2.10; pp. 26, 42 





Gini-coefficient: ( Σj=1 Σk=1 nj nk ⏐yj - yk⎮) / 2n2 * (1/n)  = 17,3 / 20 = 86,5 
 
Theil-coefficient: Σι =1 si (log si – log (1/n)) = 0,823 
 
n = amount of decile shares = 10  
si = sj = sk = the share of land of the ith decile of holdings in total land  
(listed in bold, last column) 
( Σj=1 Σk=1 nj nk ⏐sj - sk⎮) = sum of differences of the percentage distribution = 17,3 
   34
 
Table A.3: Regressions of land inequality 
 
  gini theil gini theil gini theil gini theil gini theil gini theil 
    (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6) 
CASHCROP  Dummy  0,08 0,10 0,13 0,16      0,10 0,15 0,16 0,22 0,09 0,14 
  2,34 1,96 3,51 3,02      3,25 3,43 5,03 5,10 2,94 3,20 
RICE  -0,26 -0,33 -0,22 -0,30      -0,39 -0,50 -0,40 -0,53 -0,37 -0,47 
  -2,48 -2,16 -1,90 -1,74      -4,60 -4,19 -4,29 -4,06 -4,18 -3,88 
LABOURDENSITY  -0,02 -0,02 -0,04 -0,04 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,03 -0,03     
  -2,66 -1,99 -4,72 -3,98 -2,44 -1,85  -2,11 -1,55  -4,08 -3,52     
SETMORT  0,14 0,18 0,20 0,27 0,16 0,20             
  1,98 1,77 2,59 2,35 2,04 1,91             
SETMORT^2  -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,03 -0,02 -0,02            
  -2,09 -1,90 -2,91 -2,65 -2,26 -2,16             
CREOLE  Dummy  0,09 0,15      0,10 0,16 0,08 0,12      0,12 0,17 
  2,37  2,71    2,36  2,47  2,04  2,22    3,08  3,25 
CATHOLICISM65  0,02 0,03      0,02 0,03 0,02 0,03      0,02 0,03 
  1,63  1,55    1,97  1,81  3,17  2,84    2,95  2,55 
                                      
R2  0,63 0,62 0,53 0,49 0,56 0,56 0,49 0,49 0,37 0,37 0,40 0,42 
no.  of  observations  55 51 55 51 55 51 92 85 92 85  101  94 
 
t-values below coefficients in italics.  
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Table A.4: Regressions of income inequality 
 
 gini  gini  gini    gini  gini   gini  gini   gini  gini   gini  gini   gini 
    (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6) 
LANDINEQUALITY  1,27 1,25 1,04 1,04 9,80 9,66 7,55 6,90 9,36 9,26 6,56 6,17 
  1,89 1,74 8,32 7,90 8,17 7,72 4,81 4,26 7,90 7,50 4,24 3,86 
LANDINEQUALITY  *  GDPPC90        -2,34 -2,34 -2,30 -2,29 -1,55 -1,38 -2,14 -2,14 -1,34 -1,24 
        -7,98 -7,61 -8,29 -7,92 -3,82 -3,24 -7,85 -7,51 -3,36 -2,99 
MINERALS85  *  RISKEXPROP90             0,18  0,18  0,16  0,15 
             2,35  2,25  2,13  1,96 
DEMOCRACY90           -1,84  -2,26     -1,98  -2,20 
           -2,42  -2,83     -2,63  -2,80 
SOCIALIST  DUMMY            -9,10 -9,44 -8,30 -8,79 -9,35 -9,53 -1,18 -1,23 
            -3,46 -3,48 -2,07 -2,16 -2,36 -2,34 -2,52 -2,56 
                                      
R2  0,04 0,03 0,44 0,43 0,50 0,51 0,55 0,56 0,56 0,56 0,60 0,60 
no.  of  observations  95 88 93 86 93 86 80 74 80 75 78 73 
 
t-values below coefficients in italics.  
 
 
 